Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 32

Issue 2

Article 8

10-15-2012

Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission:
The SEC's First Big Shot at Proxy Access in the Shadow of DoddFrank
Raymond E. Areshenko

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raymond E. Areshenko, Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission: The SEC's First Big
Shot at Proxy Access in the Shadow of Dodd-Frank, 32 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary Iss. 2 (2012)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol32/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange
Commission: The SEC’s First Big Shot at Proxy Access
in the Shadow of Dodd-Frank
By Raymond E. Areshenko*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 720
II.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................................................... 724
III. FACTS .................................................................................... 727
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINION .......................................................... 732
A. Consideration of Economic Consequences .......................... 732
1. Consideration of Costs and Benefits ................................. 734
2. Shareholders with Special Interests ................................... 741
3. Frequency of Election Contests ......................................... 748
B. Application of the Rule to Investment Companies ............... 751
C. The Rule Precluded Shareholders From Forming Their Own
Shareholder Nomination Procedures Under State Laws ..... 754
V.
IMPACT .................................................................................. 756
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 758

720

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

I. INTRODUCTION
“Arbitrary and Capricious” is a moniker that has enjoyed
common usage since the passage of the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA), which mandated that a regulatory agency must refrain
from rulemaking in such a manner.1 To that end, the Investment
Company Act of 1940 requires that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“Commission”) consider a rule’s effect on the
promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.2 The
primary purpose of the Commission is investor protection.3 Since
executive agencies have been granted the power to create and enforce
rules, there has naturally been a friction between the regulators and
those who are regulated. While members of the Commission are
only to be removed for cause,4 they are still political appointees and
subject to political pressure like most other members of the
government. Sometimes they have to be reined in by the other
branches through our system of checks and balances.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently
overturned Exchange Act Rule 14a-11, holding that the
Commission’s promulgation of the rule was arbitrary and capricious
in regard to several issues because it failed to consider the rule’s

* Raymond E. Areshenko is a third year Juris Doctor and Master of Dispute
Resolution candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law. Raymond
graduated from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University with a Bachelor of Science
degree in Professional Aeronautics. He thanks his family, friends, professors, and
peers for their support and guidance during the writing process. Contact:
Raymond.Areshenko@pepperdine.edu.
1

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (requiring that a reviewing court shall set
aside and hold unlawful any agency actions, findings, or conclusions when the
court finds that the agency promulgated the rule in an arbitrary and capricious
manner).
2
15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-2(c) (2006).
3
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006).
4
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935) (a
Commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office).
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effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.5 The
Commission declined to seek further review with the U.S. Supreme
Court.6 The Court of Appeals, expressing a bit of frustration by
stating that the Commission “failed once again,” found that the
Commission inadequately determined the likely economic
consequences of its rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.7 In addition, the court found that many other APA
requirements germane to the promulgation of Rule 14a-11 were
completely ignored by the Commission.8
Rule 14a-11 was part of the enormous rulemaking directive
that the passage of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) gave the Commission.9
Rule 14a-11 was designed to allow shareholders to force a
company’s management to include shareholder-nominated board of
director candidates on the company’s proxy ballots.10 The primary
way shareholders of publicly traded companies vote for directors and
other resolutions is through the use of proxy materials that the
5

Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The
primary challengers to the rule were the Business Roundtable and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. Id. at 1144. See also id. n. 17.
6
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Press Release 2011–179 (Sep. 6, 2011),
available at http:/www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm [hereinafter
Schapiro Press Release]. The Commission confirmed that it will not seek a
rehearing or U.S. Supreme Court review of the decision to vacate the rule.
However, it will continue to analyze the decision and submitted comments, with
the goal of making rules that will provide shareholders with further opportunities to
nominate directors. Id.
7
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147–48. The court stated that the
Commission committed another instance of arbitrary and capricious rulemaking in
this case, repeating similar errors that they recently made in American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and
in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
8
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–56.
9
Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, Speech at Commission Hearing: The
Regulatory Implementation and Implications of Dodd-Frank (Jan. 23, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012311klc.htm (referring
to the Commission’s rulemaking authority to adopt new proxy access rules as
“discretionary”); see also Michael Lyle et. al., Dodd-Frank, One Year Later: A
Primer On The Federal Rulemaking Process, THE METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE
COUNSEL,
at
30
(Aug.,
2011),
available
at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/August/30.pdf.
10
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147.
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company distributes to each shareholder at certain intervals, usually
some period before the annual shareholder meeting.11 This process
could be likened to the absentee ballots commonly used in the United
States where a voter is mailed voting materials ahead of time. Rather
than waiting to go to the polls on the day of the election, the voter
fills out the ballot and returns it in the mail by a predetermined date.
Rule 14a-11 required a publicly traded company to include
information on, and the ability to vote for, shareholder-nominated
candidates for director positions (“dissident directors”).12 The basic
requirements a shareholder or group of shareholders had to meet in
order to nominate a candidate for election to the board of directors
were: ownership of three percent of the company’s voting stock
(usually common stock), holding that amount for at least three years,
holding it through the election, and having no intent to effect a
change of control.13
It is clear that the Commission wishes to put more restrictions
on the management of companies.14 With the ever-present pressure
of politics upon agencies, it is exceedingly important for the courts to
firmly guard against arbitrary and capricious encroachments upon
companies, as such encroachments are not useful regulations that
maximize shareholder value and protect their interests. Although
many people may view business regulation as unimportant in their
daily lives, there are actually serious implications for most. For one,
the population is increasingly reliant on their own retirement and
investment accounts to support themselves in their later years.
National stories about the wide spread failure, or impending failure,
11

Id. at 1146–47.
Id. at 1147. The rule applied to companies subject to the Exchange Act, to
include investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act. Id.
13
75 Fed. Reg. 56675 (Sept. 16, 2010). There were four basic requirements
to be able to nominate a candidate: that the shareholder or group of shareholders
own at least three percent of the voting shares of the company, held that amount for
at least three years from the date of submitting the nomination, hold them through
the election, and intend to continue holding them after the election. Amongst many
other requirements was declaring that the shareholder or group harbored no intent
to effect a change of control of the company, and that the shareholder or group has
no direct or indirect agreements with the company in regards to a nominee. Id.
14
Schapiro Press Release, supra note 6 (reaffirming her commitment to
making it easier for shareholders to nominate director candidates with the goal of
making boards more accountable for their actions).
12
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of pension plans to meet their funding obligations are common.
These failures are widespread in a range of fund types including
those operated solely for a single company, to large funds
representing hundreds of thousands of government workers.
Moreover, most private employers have shifted from the more
traditional defined-benefit pension plans, to defined-contribution IRA
and 401k plans, placing greater responsibility on individual workers.
Inadequacy (and future unreliability) of Social Security payments is a
growing concern. Even most state and local government pensions
are paid from funds which invest heavily in publicly traded
companies. Because of this, it is very important that the management
of publicly traded companies have adequate oversight. But equally
important is preventing the government from imposing unnecessary
expenses on companies and their shareholders, or devising machinery
whereby others can impose these burdens that will hamper their
competitiveness in our increasingly competitive and global
marketplace.
Part II of this case note will briefly discuss the historical
background of the Commission and its rule-making power, and how
Rule 14a-11 came to fruition. Part III will outline the basic facts of
this case15, including the points and arguments made by opponents
and proponents of Rule 14a-11. Part IV will provide more in-depth
facts, analyze the points made by the parties, and detail how the court
ruled on each issue. Finally, Part V will discuss the impact that this
ruling may have on the business of publicly traded corporations in
the future, along with how this may affect future Commission
rulemaking.
Of further note, other rules and modifications to rules were
announced by the Commission in the same releases containing
Rule14a-11.16 The Petitioners made various arguments related to
some of these other issues in the same lawsuit and these are outside
the scope of this particular court ruling and thus not included in this
case note.17 Unless otherwise stated, “Petitioners” refers to the

15

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144.
75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
17
Id.; Pet’r’s Opening Br., Final Brief of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Respondent, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799 (D.C Cir.
Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305). The other issue most predominantly addressed in
16
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primary parties seeking review, the Business Roundtable, and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.18
Unless otherwise stated, the
“Respondent” is the Commission.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The APA was enacted in 1946 in response to the increased
number of regulatory agencies during the Roosevelt administration.19
Fear of unelected regulators and their authority to effectively
promulgate and administer new laws led to the desire to limit the
administrative agency concept.20 Some even feared that this would
result in a form of government that resembled communism and
would operate on ulterior motivations and promulgate arbitrary
directives.21
Under the APA’s standard of review, an agency rule or
regulation must not be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
the final release, and in Petitioners’ and Respondent’s briefs, was the alteration of
Rule 14a-8.
18
The state of Delaware filed a brief as Amicus Curiae in support of
overturning the rule. Br. of the State of Delaware as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Pet’r, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014797 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2011) (No.
10-1305). Seeking to overturn the rule as applied to registered investment
companies, the Investment Company Institute and Independent Directors Council
also filed a brief of Amici Curiae. See Brief of Amici Curiae Investment Company
Institute and Independent Directors Council in Support of Pet’r’s And Vacatur as
Applied to Registered Investment Companies, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL
2014798 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305).
19
George B. Shephard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–59 (1996)
(George B. Shephard is an Assistant Professor of Law at Emory University School
of Law).
20
Id. at 1559. The APA was debated in the 1930’s and 40’s, a time when
communism was a very real and imposing threat the public. To supporters of the
New Deal, these agencies were simply designed to promote efficiency–to others it
was the creeping of communism into the government. Id. The debate over the
APA stemmed from a fight over the New Deal generally, and the APA’s passage
was ultimately a cease-fire that favored New Deal proponents. Id. at 1559–60.
21
See generally Id. at 1557. While modern society has become accustomed
to administrative agencies promulgating regulations, this was a much newer
concept for the U.S. during the New Deal era. Id. In addition, there was no
standard of review with which an aggrieved party could contest what they believed
to be onerous regulations. Id.
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otherwise not in accordance with the law.22 In relating the arbitrary
and capricious standard to a given agency decision, the court must
determine the reasonableness of the agency decision and if the
decision is lacking in foundation.23 A court shall determine that an
agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously if it (1) totally fails to
consider a significant part of the problem with the proposed rule, (2)
explained its decision using evidence that runs counter to the
explanation, or (3) is based off a conclusion that is so unlikely to
match reality that it cannot be ascribed to differences in view.24
Courts use a narrow standard of review for determining whether a
rule is arbitrary and capricious and do not substitute their own
judgment for that of an agency.25 However, they must still be sure
that the Commission “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a
satisfactory explanation for . . . the facts found and the choice
made.”26
When the Commission establishes regulations, it is required
to comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.27 When
making rules applicable to investment companies, the Commission
must follow the Investment Company Act of 1940.28 In addition to
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review required by the APA,
the Commission is uniquely required under the Exchange Act to
consider whether a rule will unduly burden efficiency, competition,
or capital formation.29
In addition to the present case, the
Commission’s rules were invalidated on three other recent occasions
22

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); Alaska Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation v.
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 465 (2004).
23
Kaufman v. Kansas Dep’t. of Soc. and Rehab. Services, 811 P.2d 876, 884
(Kan. 1991).
24
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (finding the NHTSA’s rescission of the passive restraint requirement
in Standard 208 was an arbitrary and capricious action).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78.
28
Investment Company Act of 1940 is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 80.
29
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2), 80a-2(c) (2006), the Commission is
unique in that it is required to become informed of the consequences its rulemaking may have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation in order that its
rule-making does not cause more harm than help to those considerations than it
helps.
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for failing to consider efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.30
Rule 14a-11 was designed with the goal of facilitating
shareholder ability to nominate and elect directors to a company’s
board of directors.31 The most important way shareholders may
influence a company is through voting power, which enables all
owners of a company’s voting stock to elect directors.32 The
Commission viewed the 2008 financial crisis as emblematic of the
need for shareholders to be able to effectively exercise this power,
and it determined that the need was not being fully met under the
current rules.33 The Commission focused on the proxy process
because its purpose is to come as close as possible to replicating the
in-person voting process for shareholders.34 After a comment period
30
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber
of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (the court held that the
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when promulgating a rule requiring
mutual fund companies to have a board of no less than 75% independent directors,
as opposed to the current 50% requirement, and to have an independent chairman);
American Equity Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (the court held that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when
considering the effect of efficiency, competition, and capital formation when the
Commission declared that fixed indexed annuities were not annuities pursuant to
the Securities Act). The Commission must make a thorough effort in order to
determine as best as they can the effects of their rulemaking. Chamber of
Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144; American Equity, 613 F.3d at 166. Where the
Commission fails to become fully knowledgeable (thus depriving the public and
the Congress of knowledge) of the facts and considerations of the economic results
of the proposed rule, the subsequent promulgation of that rule is arbitrary and
capricious. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144.
31
75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
32
Id. at 56669. Noting that one of the core methods shareholders have to
influence the operation of a company is by right to participate in the elections of
the company’s directors. Id.
33
Id. at 56669–70. The Commission felt that there were questions of
whether company boards were providing adequate oversight of management,
whether they were focused on shareholder interests, and whether boards should be
more accountable for their decisions regarding risk management and compensation.
Id.
34
Id. at 56670. The Commission reasoned that the proxy voting process is
not similar enough to voting at the meeting because most proxy voting shareholders
cast their ballots well before the shareholder meeting, resulting in a missed
opportunity to nominate a director or view the materials regarding another
shareholder-nominated director. Id.
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in which the Commission received a series of sharply divided
comments, it decided that state laws governing shareholders’ ability
to include their director nominees in the company’s proxy voting
materials were insufficient.35 The final version of Rule 14a-11
provided that a shareholder or group of shareholders meeting certain
requirements could force the company to include its director nominee
on the company’s proxy materials.36 Traditionally, how or whether
shareholders can nominate a candidate for a director position are
issues of state law and a company’s bylaws.37 Rule 14a-11 was
designed to reach all companies subject to the Exchange Act, with
the ability to opt-in, but not opt-out.38
III. FACTS
The Commission announced its intent to publish 14a-11 in
June 2009, outlining the proposed terms of the rule and inviting

35

75 Fed. Reg. 56670–71 (Sept. 16, 2010).
Id. at 56674–75 (requiring that the shares have voting power, be equal to
at least three percent of the company, that the three percent that has been held for at
least three years, and that the shareholder or group intend to keep the shares
through the election). To illustrate the potential size of these groups, three percent
of the largest company on the Fortune 500, Wal-Mart Inc., is $5,482,929,000 as of
March 25, 2011.
Forbes 500, Full List (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/full_list/. Three percent
of the smallest company on the Forbes 500, Seaboard Corp., is $84,450,000. Id.
Proxy materials would have to include information about the shareholder and the
shareholder’s ability to vote for the nominee. 75 Fed. Reg. at 56677.
37
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware
Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1784 (2006) (relating Delaware law as
a reflection of their legislative preference for private ordering and flexibility to
create and alter securities law). It is well known that corporations of any
significant size tend to incorporate in Delaware. Id. at 1749. Moreover, it would
be well beyond the scope of this writing to examine the securities law of every
state. Delaware is the only state that filed a brief in this case, and the laws of no
other states were given any significant consideration during the promulgation of
this rule, by the parties to this case, or by the court. (Lawrence A. Hamermesh is a
Ruby R. Vale Professor of Corporate and Business Law at Widener University
School of Law).
38
75 Fed. Reg. 56678–79 (Sept. 16, 2010). Barring conflict by state law or
a company’s governing documents that were in compliance with applicable state
law, Rule 14a-11 would be mandatory for any applicable company.
36
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comment.39 The Commission received hundreds of comments that
ranged from letters by experts to in-depth economic and legal
reports.40 After an opportunity to review the comments and make
adjustment to the proposed rule, the Commission published the final
version of Rule 14a-11 in the Federal Register on September 16,
2011.41 The Commission scheduled Rule 14a-11 to take effect on
November 15, 2010, but it never went into effect as they stayed the
rule pending the outcome of this case.42 Because the APA provides
for review motions to be submitted directly to the U.S. Court of
Appeals, the Petitioners sought review with that court shortly after
Rule 14a-11’s promulgation.43 The Petitioners argued against Rule
14a-11 on several points asserting that the Commission promulgated
the rule arbitrarily and capriciously by inadequately and improperly
measuring the effect of the rule on competition, efficiency, and
capital formation.44 A three-judge panel heard oral arguments on
April 7, 2011, and issued its unanimous (there was no concurring
opinion either) ruling in favor of the Petitioners and vacating Rule
14a-11, on July 22, 2011.45 The Commission subsequently stated

39

Proposing Release, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (June 18, 2009).
See generally Adopting Release, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
41
75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
42
Press Release, No. 33-9259, SEC (Oct. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml.
43
Pet’r’s Opening Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2010 WL 5116461, at *1
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305). The Investment Company Act provides that any
party or entity who is aggrieved by rules promulgated by the Commission may
obtain a review of the rule by the United States Court of Appeals within their
corresponding jurisdiction, or by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) (2006). The petitioner must, within sixty days of the order,
request that the rule be either modified or set aside partially or in entirety. Id. No
review will be granted on any basis not previously objected to (or a show of good
cause for failing to object) during the comment period, or other similar public input
mechanism. Id. Any Commission findings as to facts will be upheld so long as
they were supported with “substantial evidence . . . .” Id. The judgment and
decree of the reviewing court will be final, and subject to review only by a grant of
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Id.
44
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146–47 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
45
Id. at 1144. Again, the court in this case only ruled on 14a-11, without
considering all of the arguments the Petitioners brought, and without ruling for the
Petitioners on all factors they argued.
40
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that it would not seek review of the decision with the U.S. Supreme
Court.46
The court found that the Commission failed to adequately
consider the economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 when
formulating the rule.47 The Commission noted that the rule imposed
the cost of printing and mailing materials about the shareholder
nominated candidates onto the companies rather than the nominating
group.48 Nevertheless, without basis, it decided that those costs,
amongst many other costs such as opposing the candidate, would be
outweighed by the benefits to shareholders who no longer had to
print and mail their own materials.49 Moreover, the Commission
concluded without sufficient evidence that the mere presence of these
dissident shareholders would increase board productivity and overall
value to shareholders.50 The court also pointed out that the
Commission ignored the issue of how the rule will affect the total
number of proxy contests because the adopting release did not
address the extent to which Rule 14a-11 will make traditional proxy
contests available under applicable state corporate laws.51
The court agreed that the Commission failed to consider how
special interests, namely institutional investors such as unions and
government pension funds, would employ the rule for their own

46

Schapiro Press Release, supra note 6.
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–50. The court determined that the
Commission inconsistently framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed to
estimate necessary cost figures; and generally failed to assess the “likely economic
consequences of Rule 14a-11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.” Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1150. Petitioners provided estimates ranging from $4 million to $14
million at large companies and $800,000 to $3 million at smaller companies. Id.
These costs would include media and public relations efforts, advertising through
various means, consultants, and the time of employees and managers. Id.
Moreover, the court found that the Commission opportunistically assumed frequent
rule use when measuring benefits, but infrequent rule use when addressing costs.
Id. at 1154.
50
Id. at 1149. The Commission took these costs into consideration, but did
not necessarily agree as to the amount and concluded that the benefits of Rule 14a11 would be worth anticipated costs. Id.
51
Id. at 1153. The court reasoned that without this information, there would
be no way to know whether the rule will be a net benefit. Id.
47
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ends.52 In its adopting release, the Commission reasoned that the
shareholder ownership requirement would limit any undue use of
Rule 14a-11 by special interest groups.53 However, the court found
that the Commission ignored compelling arguments and studies that
indicated how special interests could gain disproportionately more
towards their own objectives with the use or threat of dissident
directors than any marginal increase in value they would otherwise
receive with or without a dissident director.54 Moreover, the court
agreed with the Petitioners that these special interests could burden a
company with the significant costs of a proxy fight simply by
threatening to nominate a dissident.55
The State of Delaware submitted a brief of amicus curiae in
support of the Petitioners, arguing that Rule 14a-11 directly overrode
and contradicted Delaware corporate law.56 The court declined to
address that issue, as moot, since they vacated the rule without
having to address Delaware’s argument.57 The court also declined as
moot the Petitioner’s argument that the rule violated First
Amendment free speech rights.58
52

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1151–52.
75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (Sept. 16, 2010). Because shareholders would need to
own at least three percent of the company for at least three years, groups who met
this requirement would have demonstrated a long-term commitment to the
company. Id.
54
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152 (rebutting the Commission’s reasoning
that it was sufficient protection that shareholders would have the opportunity to
view the company’s argument against a special interest nominee and not vote for
that candidate). The court agreed with Petitioners that even if a dissident board
member was ultimately not elected, the company could expend significant
resources fighting the election, or even the threat of nomination. Id. Also, the rule
placed no restriction on what the relationship was to the nominating shareholder
group. 75 Fed. Reg. 56675 (Sept. 16, 2010). Only one dissident nominee would
have to be included in the materials and the shareholder or group with the largest
voting block would have their nominee included in the materials, regardless of
which shareholder or group was the first to nominate a candidate. Id.
55
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.
56
Final Br. of the State of Delaware, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL
2014797, at *2, *7 (Feb. 24, 2011) (No. 10-1305) (arguing that Rule 14a-11
conflicts with Delaware law’s “private ordering” right which permits shareholders
to internally self-regulate the way a company handles its affairs).
57
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.
58
Id. at 1156.
53
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Lastly, the court took issue with the inclusion of investment
companies in the rule.59 Investment companies, such as mutual
funds, are often directed by a board that is overseeing more than one
fund.60 If shareholders from a specific fund were able to nominate a
dissident director who then wins a seat on an investment company’s
board, the board would be required to hold separate meetings for only
that fund, since a dissident director would not be privy to board
discussions about other funds.61 The Commission did not completely
ignore this dilemma, but attributed whatever costs would be incurred
as stemming from the rights shareholders have to nominate director
candidates under state corporate laws.62 The Commission concluded
that in any event, the benefits of Rule 14a-11 justified the costs.63
Moreover, the Commission acknowledged that fewer fund
shareholders would utilize the rule because funds have a greater
number of retail customers who fail to meet the Rule 14a-11
qualification threshold and because investment companies are not
necessarily required under state law to hold annual meetings.64 The
court finally determined that the Commission used circular logic to
justify application of the rule to investment companies and to justify
its belief that the rule’s lesser use by investment company
shareholders would result in lower overall cost.65

59

Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1154. Typically, the boards of many investment companies are
either unitary boards that oversee all of the funds in the group, or cluster boards,
which are multiple boards within a group that each oversee a number of funds. Id.
The court cited a survey that indicated that eighty-one percent of boards are
unitary, and fifteen percent are cluster. Id.
61
Id. at 1154. The court noted the obvious inefficiencies of a system where
a board that before included discussion of a certain fund, amongst other funds, at its
meeting now had to convene additional meetings for that particular fund in order to
include a dissident board member elected to that specific fund. Id.
62
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154.
63
Id. at 1155. The Commission acknowledged Rule 14a-11 would result in
inefficiencies, increased costs, and that the use of Rule 14a-11 would likely be
lower than other publicly held companies. They dismissed this in conclusory
fashion by stating that the benefits justified the costs. Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1156.
60
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINION
The court agreed with the Petitioners that the promulgation of
Rule 14a-11 was arbitrary and capricious.66 Since the court
determined that Rule 14a-11 was arbitrary and capricious before
analyzing all the points, they declined to address the Petitioners’
argument that the Commission arbitrarily rejected the argument that
individual company shareholders could propose proxy access rules
for their own companies.67
A. Consideration of Economic Consequences
Given that the Commission is charged with considering a
rule’s effect on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” the
Commission asserted that Rule 14a-11 “may have the potential of
improving board accountability and efficiency and increasing
shareholder value.”68 The court first addressed the Commission’s
conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would result in shareholders receiving
direct savings because of reduced costs for printing and postage to
distribute information about the nominee to the other shareholders.69
The Commission estimated that those costs would be approximately
$18,000 for each nominee, in addition to numerous other costs.70
The Commission hypothesized that Rule 14a-11 will reduce
shareholder concerns about collective action and free-riders, which
occur when all shareholders receive the “benefit” of expenditures
made by other shareholders.71
66

Id. at 1148.
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148.
68
Id. at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761).
69
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56756).
70
75 Fed. Reg. 56756 (Sept. 16, 2010). The Commission reasoned that
shareholders would be more likely to use Rule 14a-11 because of the savings that
would result from not having to do their own mailings. Id. In addition, the
Commission cited comments that the mailing alone only represented about 5% of
the cost of nominating a director candidate due to the costs of advertising,
attorneys, obtaining shareholder lists, public relations, proxy solicitors, etc. Id.
The commission disputed commentators who noted that a “’mere $18,000’” did not
justify the expense of the rule. Id. at 56757.
71
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149. Free-rider and collective-action
concerns relate to the apprehension shareholders may have towards spending a
67
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The court pointed out that the Commission designed Rule
14a-11 to impose upon companies the cost of preparing, printing, and
mailing the required disclosures and other solicitations related to a
director campaign.72 The court also cited the Commission’s
recognition that the rule could have an adverse effect on the
performance of the company and the board due to, for example, the
distraction to management of a proxy fight.73 The court noted the
Commission’s conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would still “promote the
‘efficiency of the economy on the whole,’ and the benefits of the rule
would ‘justify the costs’ of the rule.”74 The Petitioners’ primary
economic arguments were that the Commission “neglected both to
quantify the costs companies would incur . . . and to substantiate the
rule’s predicted benefits.”75 They also stated that the Commission
“failed to consider the consequences of union and state pension funds
using the rule” or to “properly evaluate the frequency with which
shareholders would initiate election contests.”76

significant sum to get a nominee elected to the benefit of the rest of the
shareholders while the paying shareholder or group only gets a fractional benefit.
75 Fed. Reg. 56756.
72
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56678) (discussing
the complexity expense of various other issues related to 14a-11 such as priority of
shareholder nomination when a current dissident director is getting ready to leave,
legal advice specific to each company’s situation, and the costs of court fights
between the companies and shareholders).
73
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56765). The
Commission acknowledged that election contests are “distracting and timeconsuming” to a company’s board and management; that companies may have to
reevaluate and possibly change their own procedures for facilitating shareholder
nominations; and that the rules could result in lower quality boards if unqualified
individuals were elected. 75 Fed. Reg. 56765; see also Pet’r’s Opening Br., Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *32 (Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305).
74
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56771/3). The
Commission concluded that the Rule’s “possible” benefits of improved board
accountability and company performance justified the acknowledged costs and
would “promote the efficiency of the economy on the whole.”
75
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.
76
Id.
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1. Consideration of Costs and Benefits
The Commission acknowledged that companies might spend
significant sums of money to fight shareholder-nominated board
candidates.77 However, the Commission argued that these costs
would be limited by a couple of factors. First, to the extent that
managers have a fiduciary duty to desist from expending company
funds to fight shareholder nominees for “no good-faith corporate
purpose,” the managers may elect to simply include the nominees on
the proxy material.78 Second, the requirements that a shareholder or
shareholder group must collaborate in order to qualify to nominate a
candidate would limit the number of nominees for a board to
contest.79
The Commission did not seem to dispute the cost figures for
conducting a proxy fight, which were submitted by various
commenters.80 The Petitioners argued that the Commission failed its
duty by neither endorsing the figures provided nor providing its own
estimate.81 In any event, the Commission suggested that they might
be “discretionary” costs because Rule 14a-11 imposed no obligation
upon any company board or executive to fight a shareholder

77

75 Fed. Reg. 56770 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“[B]oards may be motivated by the
issues at stake to expend significant resources to challenge shareholder director
nominees . . . . We therefore recognize that . . . it can reasonably be expected that
the boards of some companies likely would oppose the election of shareholder
director nominees.”).
78
75 Fed. Reg. 56770; see also 75 Fed. Reg. 56668–01 n. 1011. The
Commission also sought to distinguish between costs that the company would incur
by including a shareholder candidate without a fight, such as printing and mailing
new proxy materials and costs that are borne by the company to fight that same
candidate. 75 Fed. Reg. 56770 n. 1011.
79
75 Fed. Reg. 56770.
80
Id.
81
Petr’s Opening Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *39
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305) (citing Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d
133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005), asserting that while the Commission cited some of the
figures submitted by commenters, but not endorsing them or providing their own,
the Commission failed a basic “statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise
itself . . . of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation.”).
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nominee.82 The Petitioners argued, and the court agreed, that the
Commission’s assertion that companies would simply choose not to
oppose a shareholder nominee was speculation.83 The opinion
pointed to comments submitted to the Commission during the
comment period.84
One comment from the American Bar
Association said that companies would be, in fact, compelled to resist
shareholder nominees.85 The Commission used the complete
opposite rationale to justify the rule, reasoning that shareholders
would face resistance from management if they tried to institute a
proxy access policy under current laws.86 The Commission said that
“companies . . . could frustrate shareholder efforts to establish
procedures for shareholders to place board nominees in the
company's proxy materials by litigating the validity of a shareholder
proposal establishing such procedures, or possibly repealing
shareholder-adopted bylaws establishing such procedures.”87 The
conflict in logic is quite apparent as the Commission basically states
that boards both will and will not be compelled to resist shareholdernominated director candidates.

82

75 Fed. Reg. 56770 (“Some commenters, in fact, characterized the costs
incurred . . . as discretionary because Rule 14a-11 itself does not require such
efforts.”). Id.
83
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable, 2011 WL 2014800, at *19 (“the Commission
cited no basis that the companies would opt to ‘simply’ include access candidate
material . . . without mounting strenuous opposition.”).
84
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150.
85
Id. (citing a letter sent to the Commission during the comment period by
Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Comm. On Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am. Bar. Ass’n, to
SEC 35 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1009/s71009-456.pdf (stating that if nominee of the shareholder or shareholder group
is “determined . . . not to be as appropriate a candidate as those to be nominated by
the board’s independent nominating committee . . . , then the board will be
compelled by its fiduciary duty to make an appropriate effort to oppose the
nominee . . . ”)). See also Pet’r’s Final Br., 2011 WL 2014800, at *19–20 (citing a
very similar comment from the American Bar Association).
86
75 Fed. Reg. 56672 (Sept. 16, 2010).
87
Id. (emphasis added). The Commission was expressing concern that not
all states have incorporation laws like Delaware’s, which provide forums for
shareholders to nominate directors. Id. Also inadequate were opportunities
provided by company bylaws because the board may put up significant obstacles,
such as litigation, to avoid a shareholder’s proxy access policy being passed. Id.
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The court agreed that the Commission “relied upon
insufficient empirical data” to conclude that Rule 14a-11 would
improve the performance of company boards and increase company
value for shareholders by facilitating the election of shareholder
nominees.88 The court also noted that the Commission cited
numerous compelling studies submitted by commenters that forecast
reduced performance of boards with dissident members, but then
came to the conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would increase board
performance and shareholder value.89 For example, a report
submitted by NERA Economic Consulting stated that “[t]he benefits
predicted by the SEC will be at best small, and possibly prove to be
costly rather than beneficial.”90 The report cited three benefits
forecasted by the Commission and rated them “from small to simply
implausible.”91 First, the report stated that the only direct savings to
shareholders, $18,000 in postage and printing costs, represented
about two percent of the estimated costs that a company would incur
as a result of having a shareholder nominee on the ballot.92
Secondly, the report noted that the while the Commission touted
increased transparency and better informed voting, they did not make
any attempt to quantify this benefit.93 Third, despite the great weight
of evidence indicating reduced board performance in these scenarios,
the Commission hypothesized that board performance would be
increased by the mere presence of shareholder nominated directors,
or at least because directors would work harder at their jobs in order
to stay in their positions.94 The report also stated that firms where a

88

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150–51.
Id.
90
ELAINE BUCKBERG, PH.D. & JOHATHAN MACEY, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED SEC RULE 14A-11 ON EFFICIENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPITAL
FORMATION 22 (NERA Economic Consulting Aug. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.nera.com/upload/Buckberg_Macey_Report_FINAL.pdf (Dr. Buckberg
is the Senior Vice President of NERA; Professor Macey is a Sam Harris Professor
of Law, Corporate Finance & Securities Law at Yale Law School).
91
Id. at 22.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 22–23.
89
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dissident director was elected underperformed their peers by nineteen
to forty percent during the two years following the election.95
The court found that the Commission “completely
discounted” those studies and chose to rationalize Rule 14a-11 based
on two “relatively unpersuasive studies.”96 The first was the Cernich
study, which focused on “hybrid boards”–boards with some dissident
directors.97 The second study was on the effects of proxy contests on
shareholder value in general.98 The Commission actually noted that
the Cernich study was limited99 and that the findings of the study
related to the creation of shareholder value were “difficult to
interpret.”100 Nonetheless, the Commission decided Rule 14a-11
would still improve board performance and shareholder value.101
This was in light of its substantial cost and the fact that the
Commission itself referred to its evidence in support of the rule as “at
best ‘mixed’ empirical evidence.”102
The opinion found further fault where the Commission
sourced the costs and benefits of the rule to companies, shareholder
value, and the economy as a whole.103 The Petitioners argued that
the Commission often dismissed or discounted the costs of Rule 14a-

95

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.
Id. (Stating that the Commission relied “exclusively and heavily” on these
two studies, the first being CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF HYBRID
BOARDS (IRRC INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY May 2009), available
at www.irrcinstitue.org/pdf/IRRC_05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf (may have to
alternately
click
on
download
link
available
at
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/projects.php?project=36)). The second study is J.
Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contest & Corporate Change:
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279 (1998).
97
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.
98
Id.
99
Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 n. 911).
100
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.
101
Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761). The Commission also reasoned that the
presence of Rule 14a-11 would improve board performance and shareholder value
by causing boards to be more responsive, and thus better; it would also improve, of
course, the actual election of dissident shareholders. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at
1151.
102
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.
103
Id.
96
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11 as costs that were already borne under state laws.104 Conversely,
when considering benefits enjoyed while using the rule, it counted
them as new benefits gained under the rule.105 The court cited the
Commission’s allocation of negatives, such as distraction to
management and the loss of time the board may devote to long term
planning, as being associated with the long-standing state law right
that shareholders have to nominate and elect dissident directors.106
The court found that the Commission’s logic was illogical and stated
that its use in economic analysis was “unacceptable.”107
Another example of unsubstantiated conclusions and
inconsistent allocation of costs and benefits is the Commission’s
theory that the rule would increase shareholder value because of
“better decision-making” arising from increased board
transparency.108 Rule 14a-11 provided that if a company negotiated

104

Id.
Id. An additional example of the Commission’s analysis style is the
stated assertion that boards may reexamine their procedures for shareholders to
nominate a director candidate. 75 Fed. Reg. 56765. The Commission concluded
that boards may incur costs resulting from a re-evaluation of these policies, but
then dismissed these costs as only being limited “to the extent that the new rules
improve the overall efficiency of the director nomination process and lead to
improvements in the existing procedures for director nominations.” 75 Fed. Reg.
56765 (Sept. 10, 2010). The Commission’s reasoning was that where those types
of costs existed, they would be attributed to something else, or at the very least
those costs would only be linked to a rule where the rule resulted in an
improvement to shareholders.
106
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. Petitioners pointed out the
Commission, in considering the benefits of the rule, “did not once state that they
arose from state law.” Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL
2014800, at *33.
107
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (the court analogized this type of logic
to the logic the Commission relied on, and the court rejected, in Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005), stating the “rule would not
create ‘costs associated with the hiring of staff because boards typically have this
authority under state law,’ and assuming that ‘whether a board is authorized by law
to hire additional staff in no way bears upon’ the question whether the rule would
‘in fact cause the fund to incur additional staffing costs.’”) (emphasis added).
108
75 Fed. Reg. 56765 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“The additional communication
between a board and the company's shareholders may lead to enhanced
transparency into the board's decision-making process, more effective monitoring
of this process by shareholders, and, ultimately, a better decision-making process
by the board.”).
105
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with a nominating shareholder or group and the board agreed to
include the nominee, the nominee would count towards the 25%
maximum dissident director limit under 14a-11.109 Of course, this
calculation assumes, against the evidence, that the board would
negotiate with nominators and include their nominee. This figure
also assumes the negotiations would result in increased board
transparency and that this transparency would be beneficial. Finally,
the Commission did not give any reason why the shareholder’s
increased influence over the board would result in better value. No
evidence was provided to support the theory that shareholder
expertise in a given industry is superior to that of the management.
In his scholarly article on the role of institutional investors in
corporate governance, prominent securities attorney and corporate
analyst Robert Vanecko states that “[i]ncreased activism by
American institutional investors is unlikely to improve corporate
performance because American institutional investors do not have the
expertise to monitor and discipline management.”110 He goes on to
point out that many public pension funds “act like politicians rather
than investors,” especially with politically charged issues, and that
“[p]ublic pension funds are typically directed by politicians.”111
Ruling that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously
by using these rationalizations to promulgate Rule 14a-11 was a solid
response by the Court and in accordance with precedent from
recently decided cases.112 It is a well-known axiom in law that it is
not enough to point to a condition, like a state law right that could
possibly result in a cost, as the actual reason a cost being incurred.
The Commission’s conclusion, that costs may be avoided simply by a
109

Id.
Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of
Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 376, 406
(1992) (referring to American investors specifically because institutional investors
in some other countries he discusses have much more business experience in the
industry in which they invest, whereas it is uncommon in the U.S.).
111
Id. at 413.
112
See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 143 (stating that whether state
law authorized an additional expenditure did not bear upon whether the rule would
in fact cause additional expense); American Equity Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613
F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that even if costs are “associated” with state
law rights, the Commission still has an obligation to assess and consider the
“economic implications” of the rule).
110
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board not objecting to a candidate or shareholders not using the rule,
was wishful thinking. The assertion that a board would have no good
faith purpose for opposing a dissident candidate presupposes
dissident candidates will be equally or better qualified than the
candidates a board nominates. The Petitioners pointed out numerous
sources of opposing data, such as the American Bar Association
letter from Jeffrey Rubin, concluding that a board has a fiduciary
duty to oppose less suited candidates; the Cernich study, which
predicted poorer performance by dissident boards; numerous
comments from business leaders; and the off-point studies that the
Commission chose to rely on.113 While discussing shareholder
proposals that could affect director positions, Professor David Porter
stated that such proposals “could be viewed as extremely threatening
by the directors” and that they might “fight the[m] . . . tooth-andnail.”114
Further, the Commission did not dispute the substantial cost
figures given for the cost of proxy fights, but it did not accept them
as reliable either. There is no way of knowing what the Commission
believed the costs to be, except that the Commission determined 14a11 would increase shareholder value and that its benefits would
justify the costs. As the Petitioners pointed out, it made little sense
for the Commission to consider limited use of the rule as a basis to
assess the rule’s cost; speculating on overall limited use does nothing
to address the cost each time the rule is used.
Considering all these points, it is readily apparent that the
court was correct to decide that the Commission failed to consider
the rule’s effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Even if it had an estimate, how could the Commission properly
113

See generally Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL
2014800 (Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305).
114
David P. Porter, Institutional Investors and Their Role in Corporate
Governance: Reflections By a “Recovering” Corporate Governance Lawyer, 59
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 663–64 (2009). Professor Porter describes a scenario
where institutional shareholders propose a measure that, if approved, would require
board members to get a majority vote to maintain their seat; this proposal is
analogous to the present case in that both relate to shareholder proposals which
could threaten a company with losing its board member. Id. (David P. Porter is an
Adjunct Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law and
a retired partner of the Cleveland Office of Jones Day, where he worked from
1981-2008).
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consider costs of the rule when it was brushing significant costs aside
(regardless of the amount it estimated the costs to be) as not
attributable to the rule?
2. Shareholders with Special Interests
The court next addressed the Petitioners’ argument that the
Commission failed to consider an important problem which could
arise from use of Rule 14a-11, specifically how special interests such
as unions, government pension funds, and hedge funds would use
Rule 14a-11 to further their own narrow interests at the expense of
shareholders as a whole.115 The Petitioners argued that the
Commission received substantial commentary arguing that unions
and other special interests would use the rule to gain concessions that
did not increase shareholder value.116 In the adopting release, the
Commission pointed to comments it received regarding issues on
independent board chairman, majority voting, and cumulative voting
as a way to demonstrate the “degree of interest in using Rule 14a-11”
by inferring interest in these issues to predict interest in using 14a11.117
The Petitioners contended that the study which the
Commissioners relied upon “unwittingly confirmed the role unions
and government funds would play under the rules” by pointing out
that the study showed that two-thirds of all those proposals were
submitted by union and government funds.118 Petitioners bolstered
this argument by pointing to the Georgeson Report used by the
Commission, which showed that out of thirty-nine proposals to adopt
majority voting requirements for directors, thirty-eight were from

115

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. Petitioners argued that the
Commission neglected its duty, “entirely fail[ing] to consider an important aspect
of the problem . . . .” Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
116
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1151–52.
117
75 Fed. Reg. 56743 n. 804 (Sept. 16, 2010).
118
See Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800 at
*39–40 (stating that the Commission “unwittingly confirmed the role unions and
government funds would play under the rules” and referencing a report relied upon
by the Commission that estimated that two-thirds of shareholder proposals related
to independent board chairmen, majority voting, and cumulative voting were
brought by union and government pension funds).
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union and government funds.119 Likewise, they were responsible for
twenty-three out of twenty-seven shareholder proposals to require an
independent chairman.120 Indeed, in the adopting release the
Commission referred to “shareholders who link the recent financial
crisis to a lack of responsiveness of some boards to shareholder
interests.”121 This list included eighteen individuals or entities, ten
being union or government pension funds.122
The court, agreeing with the Petitioners that unions and other
special interests would be most likely to use Rule 14a-11, noted the
Commission’s acknowledgement123 that companies and shareholders
would be injured if special interests used Rule 14a-11, but came to
the “conclusion that ‘the totality of the evidence and economic
theory’ both indicate the rule ‘has the potential of creating the benefit
of improved board performance and enhanced shareholder value.’”124
The Commission reasoned that these costs may be limited by
the parts of the rule that limited shareholder or group eligibility, such
as the requirement to hold three percent of the company’s voting
stock for at least three years, and would limit use of the rule to those
who had a long-term commitment to the company.125 In other words,
the Commission believed the rule would be used by shareholders
who are interested in shareholder value.126 They also reasoned that
shareholders are aware of the valuable and limited time board
119

Id. at *40 (citing the Georgeson Report (2010) considered by the
Commission at 75 Fed. Reg.56743 n. 804) (Georgeson, Inc. is a major provider of
strategic shareholder consulting services). The Georgeson Report is available at
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/acgr.php.
120
Id.
121
75 Fed. Reg. at 56670 (Sept. 16, 2010).
122
See id. at n. 29.
123
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152 (the court noted that the Commission
did not consider the problem in haec verba (meaning “in these words” or that
something is recited in the exact language)).
124
Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761).
125
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152. The Commission reasoned that other
protections existed and cited that in addition to the narrowing of potential
nominating entities, the provision allowing only one dissident director on the board
or twenty five percent of the board, whichever is greater, via Rule 14a-11 would
also limit a degradation in board effectiveness. 75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (Sept. 16,
2010).
126
75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (Sept. 16, 2010).
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members have and that shareholders would be loath to waste board
time on a distracting proxy fight.127 In addition, the Commission
believed that the company’s shareholders could be alerted to
candidates who may not have shareholder value in mind, giving them
the information to make an informed vote.128 The Commission
further concluded that once a dissident director was elected, the
director’s fiduciary duty would prevent him or her from taking any
action that benefitted a special interest at the expense of the
shareholders.129
The Petitioners argued that the Commission failed to address
concerns that the rule would impose burdens on companies,
regardless of whether the dissident nominee is elected, due to the cost
of succumbing to demands that have nothing to do with shareholder
value, threatening a nomination for use as leverage to extract
concessions from the company, or the cost of opposing and defeating
the dissident nominee.130 The court echoed multiple commenter’s
remarks, stating that “as more than one commenter noted, ‘public and
union pension funds’ are the institutional investors ‘most likely to
make use of proxy access.’”131 However, it did not express complete

127

75 Fed. Reg. 56765 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“The cost also may be offset to the
extent that shareholders understand that the board's time and other resources are in
scarce supply and will take these considerations into account in deciding to
nominate directors, recognizing that the cost of a distracted board may not justify
pursuing their own specific concerns.”).
128
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.
129
75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (reasoning that a dissident director, once elected,
would have the same fiduciary duties as the other board members).
130
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152. Petitioners asserted that the
Commission never used the word “union” (except where they listed their submitted
comments) throughout the final rule despite the great amount of comments
received related to shareholder activism by unions and other special interests.
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *41. Petitioners
further argued that the Commission’s argument that shareholders would not wish to
waste the valuable time of board members was exactly why threatening a proxy
fight could be used as leverage by activist shareholders. Id.
131
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152 (citing a letter from Jonathan D.
Urick, Council of Institutional Investors, to SEC (Jan. 14, 2010) at 2, available at
http://www. cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource% 20center/correspondence/2010/1–14–
10% 20Proxy% 20Access% 20Comment% 20Letter.pdf [hereinafter Urick Letter]
(expressing support for Rule 14a-11 while acknowledging that it would impose
costs upon companies)).
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ease of use by pension funds and unions. The comment said that
because of diversification policies, almost all institutional investors,
and even larger funds, hold only small interests in public
companies.132 Assuming this is generally accurate, these special
interests would need to collaborate in order to qualify to use Rule
14a-11. However, a study of the fifty largest companies, as
determined by market capitalization, indicates this would not involve
much collaboration, if any.133 Of the fifty companies that the top five
institutional investors most commonly invested in, the aggregate
amount of outstanding shares they owned ranged from 7.6% to
33.5%.134 In almost all of the fifty companies they most commonly
invested in, the percentage was in the upper teens or twenties.135
Despite the Commission’s responses that the rule would
promote use by investors interested in shareholder value, the court
agreed with the Petitioners that the Commission, at the very least,
failed to respond to numerous concerns regarding use of Rule 14a-11
by activist institutional shareholders.136 The opinion highlighted the
Commission’s failure to respond to numerous and serious comments
that unions, along with state and local governments, often have
special interests in jobs that may far outweigh any interest in share
value.137 For example, in his article, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine
opined that “unlike the individual investors whose capital they use to
wield influence, institutional investors and their advisors bear far less
of the residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their compensation
turns more on short-term factors than on long-run growth.”138 In
132

Urick Letter, supra note 131, at 2.
See Elaine Buckberg, Ph.D. & Johathan Macey, Report on Effects of
Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 on Efficiency, Competitiveness and Capital Formation,
NERA Economic Consulting (Aug. 17, 2009) at 25–26, available at
http://www.nera.com/upload/Buckberg_Macey_Report_FINAL.pdf.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.
137
Id.
138
Leo E. Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1759, 1765 (2006) (cited in Pet’r’s Final Br., 2011 WL 2014800, at *10, *17,
*40 (No. 10-1305)). (Chancellor Leo E. Strine is the Chancellor of the Delaware
Court of Chancery (he was Vice Chancellor during the comment period), a Law
Dragon, a Robert B. and Candace J. Haas Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School,
133
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another scholarly article submitted to the Commission, Professor
Stephen Bainbridge wrote: “the two classes of institutions most likely
to make significant use of those powers—union and state and local
employee pension funds—are precisely the classes most likely to
misuse those powers in the pursuit of private benefits.”139
Bainbridge concluded that the involvement of active investors in
company management will contradict “the very mechanism that
makes the widely held public corporation practicable: namely, the
centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority
in the board of directors.”140 Naturally, there was great concern that
special interests could be expected to pursue self-interested
objectives which would likely cause companies, at a loss to the
economy as a whole, to spend significant sums of money and time to
fight dissident nominees regardless of whether the nominee could
win.141
In her legal article provided to the Commission on the role of
labor in corporate governance, Marlene O’Connor stated that “unions
have devised innovative strategies to use shareholder rights to
exercise unprecedented power over managers.”142 O’Connor also
wrote that while most unions limit their influence to “so-called”
governance practices that promote shareholder value, she pointed to
and an Adjunct Professor of Law at both the University of Pennsylvania and
Vanderbilt University Law Schools).
139
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy And Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006). (Stephen Bainbridge is
the William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at UCLA where he
primarily teaches corporate law).
140
Id. at 1749.
141
Id. (citing as an example the Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable
on the Proposed Election Contest Rules and the Proposed Amendment to the
Shareholder Proposal Rule 102 (August 17, 2009), available at
http://businessroundtable.
org/uploads/hearingsletters/downloads/BRT_Comment_Letter_to_SEC_on_File_No_S7–10–09.pdf
(“state governments and labor unions . . . often appear to be driven by concerns
other than a desire to increase the economic performance of the companies in
which they invest” (citing Strine, supra note 138, at 1765)). See also Georgeson
Report, supra note 119 (stating that the level of dissident success during elections
has dropped to 31%).
142
Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J 97, 110 (2000) (cited in Pet’r’s Final Br.,
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *10, *17, *40, *45).

746

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

the AFL-CIO’s steps to “develop a worker-shareholder view of the
firm to account for the needs of workers more directly”143 and cited
the AFL-CIO’s increased practice of organizing other union pension
funds to amass large groups of shareholders in order to coordinate
their voting power.144
Under Rule 14a-11, nominating shareholder(s) were required
to certify that they were not “holding the company's securities with
the purpose, or with the effect, of changing control of the company or
to gain a number of seats on the board of directors that exceeds the
maximum number of nominees that the company may be required to
include under Rule 14a-11.”145 It is no wonder that this provision did
not sway the court to rule for the Commission. As explained above,
a shareholder does not have to be seeking control of the company in
order to cause significant cost and disruption. Nor can a simple
pledge by a nominating investor, claiming to harbor no intent to
effect control of the company, be reassuring to the management or
the remainder of shareholders who will bear the burden of a proxy
fight. As Strine points outs, institutional investors do not “owe
fiduciary duties to the corporations whose policies they seek to
influence.”146
While counting the percentage of dissident
shareholders on a board is fairly simple, proving intent is difficult.
Petitioners pointed to recent examples of union pension fund
activism at shareholders’ expense using a Wall Street Journal article
regarding the financial advisory firm, Lazard Ltd.147 The American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Workers (AFSCME)

143

Id. at 97.
Id. at 110.
145
75 Fed. Reg. 56675 (Sept. 16, 2010).
146
Strine, supra note 138, at 1765.
147
See Pet’r’s Initial Reply Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 758644
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305) (citing Raise My Company’s Taxes, WALL STREET
JOURNAL
(Jan.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703779704576073980682909272.
html.). The article refers to AFSCME’s pressure against not only Lazard, but other
companies, to include in annual reports information about risks that are created by
the company’s efforts to reduce their tax owed to federal, state, and municipal
entities. The article quotes AFSCME’s “director of capital strategies” that
AFSCME is “trying to challenge the assumption that everyone makes that it’s
always better for shareholders to pay as little taxes as you can.” Id.
144
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pension plan invests in Lazard stock.148 AFSCME, whose 1.6
million members receive their income and pension plans through
taxes, sent a letter to Lazard arguing that tax regulators “may
‘challenge’” Lazard’s tax avoidance and minimization structure.149
To protect against what AFSCME apparently assumed to be a threat
to shareholders, even though it cited no wrongdoing of Lazard, it
called on Lazard to detail its tax strategy in the annual report.150 The
inference and assumption AFSCME made is that it is improper to
consider tax minimization to always be in the best interest of
shareholders.151 Lawfully minimizing any expense is not a concept
that should require justification or explanation. Nor should a
company have to make public its strategy, which affects its
competitiveness, simply to placate a special interest. The seemingly
obvious interest AFSCME has in companies not avoiding taxes lies
in increasing tax revenues to ease pressure on governments to reduce
expenditures on salaries and pension benefits, both of which directly
affect AFSCME’s narrow interests.
To exercise influence over a company’s management, a
special interest group does not need to effect control of the company.
It is enough just to exert undue pressure. Rule 14a-11 would have
provided that fulcrum. For every expense or burden the management
faces, its fiduciary duty will compel it to evaluate the cost of the
response and the practicability of that response. The greater the cost
or burden, the greater the likelihood that that board will give
something up because the cost of resisting the burden may be greater
than the cost itself. Naturally, it could be nearly impossible to

148

Id.
Id.
150
Id. (also warning Lazard and other companies that AFSCME was pushing
for regulations to force them to publish company tax strategy in their annual
reports).
151
Pet’r’s Initial Reply Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 758644
(2011). See also Shutting Up Business – Now Unions Are Turning to Shareholder
Proposals to Limit Political Speech, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Dec. 28, 2011), at
A14,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204224604577030260580411048.
html (discussing efforts by major unions to force companies to disclose their
political donations in order to facilitate the unions’ ability to stop company
contributions to political causes that the unions do not agree with).
149
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entirely measure the long-term effects when compared with all the
other factors that affect a company’s performance.
The court determined that the Commission should have given
greater consideration and further explanation to those concerns,
stating, “by ducking serious evaluation of the cost that could be
imposed upon companies from use of the rule by shareholders
representing special interests, particularly union and government
pension funds, we think the Commission acted arbitrarily.”152 The
Circuit ruled appropriately, as the Commission left unaddressed
serious effects 14a-11 could have upon shareholders.
The
Commission failed to “examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for the facts found and the choice made.”153
Because of this, the Commission failed to apprise itself of the
relevant information necessary to balance the cost of the rule against
its benefits. Accordingly, the rule was found to be arbitrary and
capricious.
3. Frequency of Election Contests
The court took note of the number of estimated election
contests that would involve 14a-11. When the Commission first
proposed the rule they estimated that 269 companies would use Rule
14a-11 each year to propose nominees.154 When the Commission
published the adopting release, it revised the figures to a total of
fifty-one companies, citing the more restrictive change in eligibility
requirements set forth in the adopting release as the reason for the
change.155 The Petitioners argued that such a drastic change was
unreasonable given that the Commission stated that the ownership
threshold it adopted makes it possible for “a significant number of
shareholders either individually or a number of shareholders . . . [to]
satisfy the holding requirement.”156 The Petitioners further argued
that the Commission failed to reconcile the apparent inconsistency
that such a significantly smaller group of eligible shareholders or
shareholder groups would somehow attain the claimed benefits of
Rule 14a-11, as opposed to traditional proxy contest methods, if it

152

Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
153
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was so much harder to qualify for eligibility to use 14a-11.157
Petitioners premised this argument on the Commission’s reliance on
the “frequent” use of “direct printing and mailing cost savings” when
tallying the benefits of 14a-11.158
The court agreed with the Commission that the total number
of shareholder attempts to nominate directors may be higher with
14a-11, but that revising the estimate from 269 to 51 was not
arbitrary and capricious.159 The Commission argued, in contrast to
14a-11’s three year/three percent requirement, that “[o]ne who has
owned a single share for one day can start a traditional proxy contest
. . . .”160 Even with 14a-11 in place, shareholders would still have
traditional proxy contest methods available as before.161 That the
total number of efforts by shareholders to nominate dissident
directors will be higher when shareholders have two ways to
nominate a director, rather than one, is a reasonable conclusion.162
Absent dramatic extremes in the requirements to use 14a-11, it would
154

See Proposing Release, SEC, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024, 29064 (June 18, 2009).
The Commission estimated that 208 companies under the Exchange Act and 61
registered investment companies would receive Rule 14a-11 nominations. Id.
155
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152–53. The Commission stated in the
Adopting Release that the estimated number of companies eligible to make
nominations under Rule 14a-11 would decrease to 51, 45 Exchange Act companies
and six registered investment companies. 75 Fed. Reg. 56743–44. The
Commission further stated this decrease was due to the heightened requirements to
be eligible under 14a-11 such as the three year holding and three percent ownership
requirements. Id. at 56744.
156
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800 at *36
(emphasis removed) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56692).
157
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153; see also Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *36–37; see also 75 Fed. Reg. 56756
(Sept. 16, 2010).
158
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1153 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56756).
159
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153.
160
Respondent’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305).
161
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1153. Nominations can be conducted
under traditional methods such as those available under state law, or under 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a–8, which permits a wide variety of shareholder proposals and
requires lesser eligibility requirements; Rule 14a-8 is not challenged in this case,
but is referenced throughout the releases and briefs as another shareholder proposal
method.
162
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1153.
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likely be difficult to predict with any specificity what difference
changes to the qualification requirements would have on the number
of nominees produced exclusively from the new rule.
Next, the court determined that the Commission acted
arbitrarily when balancing the cost and benefits of using Rule 14a-11
as related to the total number of proxy contests initiated under all
methods available to shareholders.163 Petitioners argued that the
Commission neglected to estimate how many proxy contests, as
defined by those which would otherwise occur under the traditional
methods currently available, would be replaced by those under Rule
14a-11.164 Pointing to a failure to adequately inform themselves of
the net effect on the number of total director proxy contests, the court
stated that, although the Commission foresaw beneficial results
because Rule 14a-11 would “mak[e] election contests a more
plausible avenue for shareholders to participate,”165 without this
“crucial datum,”166 the Commission had no way of knowing whether
the rule would result in enough contests to be of net benefit—
assuming that it becomes a net benefit at some point.167 What the
APA required from the Commission was an analysis of what the
expected increase in shareholders would be. It would do little good
to impose Rule 14a-11 upon the investing public without knowing
how many Rule 14a-11 nominations occurred relative to traditional
methods. If the number of times Rule 14a-11 would be used
approximated a decrease in the use of methods already available,
then the Commission would have arbitrarily placed another
regulation with little to no net benefit.
The court found the Commission’s analysis of the estimated
rate of the use of Rule 14a-11 was “internally inconsistent” and thus
arbitrary.168 In the adopting release, the Commission forecast
savings to shareholders using Rule 14a-11 because it imposed the
cost of printing and mailing proxy material directly onto the
company, and this shift would naturally spur nominations that were
163

Id.
Id.
165
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761 (Sept. 16,
2010)) (emphasis added).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
164
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otherwise foreclosed due to those costs.169 The court pointed to
letters the Commission used to support its theory, which stated that
approximately fifteen percent (several hundred) of companies listed
on the stock exchanges expected to receive a nomination (recall that
the Commission revised its estimate to fifty-one) for directors under
14a-11.170 The court agreed with the Petitioners that the Commission
projected frequent use of the rule when tallying the benefits.171 This
estimate was a contradiction of the lower estimate the Commission
gave when projecting Rule 14a-11’s total costs at other parts in the
release, particularly when calculating costs of solicitation and
campaigning.172
B. Application of the Rule to Investment Companies
At this stage the court already determined that Rule 14a-11
was arbitrary and capricious. Still, the court took up the Petitioners’
concerns regarding the application of the rule to investment
companies in the event that 14a-11 is modified and re-imposed.173
The court echoed the Petitioners’ point that investment companies
are already covered by the various other laws that afford investors
protections not available to shareholders of regular stock owned
companies, such as the Investment Company Act (ICA).174 The
Commission argued that the ICA provides a “panoply” of protections
to shareholders of investment companies, but reasoned – as it did in
its adopting release – that the ICA only provides added protections to
state corporate laws.175 It next argued that the ICA does not deal

169

Id. See also 75 Fed. Reg. 56756 (Sept. 16, 2010).
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153–54. One comment the Commission
relied on is a letter based on the Proposal and a survey of company directors. See
75 Fed. Reg. 56756 n. 872 (letter from Kenneth L. Altman, President, The Altman
Group, Inc., to SEC
(Jan. 19, 2010)
at 3, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7–10–09/s71009–605.pdf).
171
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154.
172
Id. at 1150–51, 1154.
173
Id. at 1154.
174
Id. (using as an example 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a), which requires a vote by
the majority of shareholders to change a fund’s “sub classification”).
175
See Respondent’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799,
at *51 (Feb. 25, 2011) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684 & n. 141).
170
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with state law proxy access rules or a shareholder’s ability to
nominate a director under state laws, a fact that the Commission
discussed in the Adopting Release as well.176 To further justify the
application, the Commission referred to the substantial
responsibilities of investment-company boards, such as the approval
of advisory contracts.177 Petitioners pointed out that the ICA actually
does require shareholder approval of advisory contracts.178
As previously explained, investment companies are often
governed by unitary or cluster boards.179 In responding to comments
the Commission received espousing the efficiencies gained by boards
governing multiple funds as well as the threat to efficiency under
Rule 14a-11, the Commission acknowledged that the rule may
decrease efficiency due to disrupted board structures.180 Dismissing
the Commission’s argument that the “policy goals and the benefits of
the rule justify these costs,”181 the court stated that it “erroneously
attributed” the costs to existing state law rights.182 The Commission
also determined that the costs of Rule14a-11 would be lower for
investment companies as there are fewer institutional investors able
to meet the three-year holding requirement.183 Further, there would
not be as many opportunities for director elections because not all
states require an annual board meeting.184
Another theory the Commission advanced was that
disruptions to unitary or cluster boards could be avoided by using
confidentiality agreements.185 In response to this, the Petitioners

176

Id. at *52 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56,684; 56,763; 56,766).
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154–55 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684).
178
Id. at 1154–55 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a), and analogizing to
American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178–79
(D.C. Cir. 2010), finding the Commission’s analysis incomplete for failure to
determine whether protections existed under another regulatory regime and thus
failing to consider the benefits of the rule and promotion of efficiency).
179
Id. at 1155 (citing Rubin, supra note 85, at 61–62).
180
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684).
181
75 Fed. Reg. 56684 (Sept. 16, 2010).
182
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155.
183
Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56,685 (Sept. 16, 2010)).
184
Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56685).
185
Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56685); see also Respondent’s Final Br., Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799, at *55–56 (responding that confidentiality
177
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argued that the Commission received numerous comments explaining
that “directors would have no obligation to sign such agreements and
the agreements would not prevent the loss of attorney-client
privilege.”186
The Commission’s final rationale was that
shareholders could avoid or acquiesce to any cost increases or
efficiency reductions if they chose not to elect the dissident director
once they were provided with warnings that electing the director may
result in increased costs and a disruption of the board structure.187
Holding that the Commission acted arbitrarily, the court
described the Commission’s application of Rule 14a-11 to investment
companies as “unutterably mindless.”188 The court found that the
Commission’s rationale in applying the rule to investment companies
was akin to the same logic rejected in earlier parts of the case—that
the rule was economically justified because it would only burden
shareholders if it was actually used.189 Ultimately, it held that the
Commission failed to sufficiently consider whether the application of
14a-11 to investment companies was necessary given the
requirements and protections already imposed under the ICA.190
This was an accurate response by the court.
The
Commission’s assertion that the ICA does not govern proxy access
the same way that Rule 14a-11 will is insufficient, especially since
the Commission acknowledged that significant protections exist for
shareholders of investment companies. One of the central tenets
offered in justification of Rule 14a-11 was that boards would be more
accountable to shareholders, a far broader goal than shareholder
oversight of “advisory contracts.” Even if it is true that the net of
state and federal regulations covering investment companies is
similar to that covering operating companies, it does not mean that
state laws addressing proxy access are insufficient simply because
the ICA does not specifically cover proxy access. The burden is still
agreements could be made a condition of appointment; that the Petitioners’
assertion that dissident directors would not sign the agreement because it was
voluntary is speculative; and that concerns that a confidentiality agreement might
be too broad to be enforced was unsupported).
186
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *55.
187
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684).
188
Id. at 1155–56.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1156.
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on the Commission, as the court pointed out, to “‘determine whether,
under the existing regime, sufficient protections existed’ to advance
the stated benefits of the rule and to promote efficiency.”191 Given
the issues related to the costs of Rule 14a-11, it seems the
Commission fell quite short of justifying the costs of the rule against
its benefits.
While the Commission argued that the Petitioners had no
solid basis for contending that directors would not voluntarily sign a
confidentiality agreement, it missed the mark because it would not be
adequate even if the Commission had been correct. Given the costs
and burdens that Rule 14a-11 would likely impose, requiring a
confidentiality agreement seems insufficient. A dissident shareholder
could exert great pressure on a board even without getting elected
and there is always the chance that the director could simply refuse to
sign the agreement after he won. At that point, the horse has left the
barn and remaining at issue will be whether the company is supposed
to hold another costly election, keep the seat empty until the next
election, bring in the second place candidate, or reinstate the previous
director. These possibilities may be somewhat more remote and even
repairable through adjusting the rule. On balance, it seems that the
Commission did not give much serious consideration to how the rule
applies to investment companies, and this was arbitrary and
capricious.
C. The Rule Precluded Shareholders From Forming Their Own
Shareholder Nomination Procedures Under State Laws
To prevent future conflict and economize judicial,
Commission, and commenter resources, the court should have
addressed the Petitioners’ claim. The Petitioners’ (including the
State of Delaware’s amici) argument was that the Commission
arbitrarily rejected proposals calling for Rule 14a-11 to permit the
shareholders of individual companies to decide whether to enact
dissident nomination mechanisms.192 Bolstering the Petitioners’
191

Id. at 1155 (citing American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v.
SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
192
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149. Petitioners argued that 14a-11
imposed a proxy access mechanism that shareholders would be stuck with, without
giving them the opportunity to seek such corporate policies under their current state
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claim, the State of Delaware, as amicus curiae, argued that its own
securities laws would be at odds with Rule 14a-11.193 Delaware’s
argument was bolstered by support from its bar association, warning
of “significant” stripping of rights currently available to
shareholders.194 The Commission responded that 14a-11 actually
helped promote state law policies of shareholder nomination rights
and that it did not contradict state laws because Rule 14a-11 would
not apply if a company’s governing documents or the applicable state
laws entirely “’prohibit shareholders from nominating candidates for
the board of directors.’” 195 The Commission added that a company
or state could change the terms of its nomination procedure, so long
as any shareholder or group meeting the 14a-11 requirements could
still submit a nominee.196
The court certainly could have addressed the Petitioners’
argument as it could very well come up during a future rulemaking
session. The Commission basically asserted that since Rule 14a-11
did not prohibit other avenues for shareholders to nominate directors,
it did not conflict with shareholder’s state law rights.

rights. Pet’r’s Opening Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2010 WL 5116461, at *46–
47. Petitioners pointed out that 14a-11 left shareholders with no way to modify,
repeal, or broaden the ability of shareholders to nominate and elect director
candidates. Id. Petitioners further argued that the Commission inconsistently and
incorrectly concluded that 14a-11 protected a shareholder right granted under
federal law, but then apparently found that only certain shareholders had this right.
Id.
193
Final Br. of the State of Delaware, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL
2014797, at *2. Delaware argued that 14a-11 is “completely contradictory to
Delaware’s newly adopted statute governing proxy access.” Id. It reasoned that
14a-11 took away the shareholder rights of Delaware companies by disregarding
the State’s law permitting shareholders to determine their own company’s bylaws
as provided under Delaware law. Id. at *1–2. See also Delaware General
Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (West 2012). See also
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *51 (citing a
comment submitted to the Commission from the Delaware State Bar Association
warning that “[r]ule 14a-11 would deprive stockholders and boards of directors of
significant rights and powers under state law”).
194
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *51.
195
Respondent’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799, at
*31–32 (emphasis added).
196
Id. at *32.
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Equally flawed was the Commission’s argument that Rule
14a-11 is not contradictory to state law shareholder rights because it
does not apply to a company where the bylaws or state laws prohibit
shareholder nomination of director candidates. In order to avoid the
rule altogether, a company or state would have to ban shareholders
from nominating directors, an obvious burden to expect a shareholder
to accept. Not only did this provision fail to increase shareholder
access under state laws, it forced states, companies, and shareholders
to choose whether to accept Rule 14a-11 or completely rid
themselves of any shareholder rights to nominate a director
candidate.
V. IMPACT
The judges of the D.C. Circuit have again prevented an
arbitrary and capricious rule from being foisted onto the public’s
shoulders. If upheld, Rule 14a-11 would have served little purpose
other than providing a means through which certain shareholders can
exercise their personal interests at the expense of the remaining
shareholders. While it is possible to do this under the traditional
methods if an election is won and the insurgent directors win a vote
for reimbursement, it generally must be done initially at the expense
and inconvenience of the dissenting shareholders.
Another positive impact of this case is that it refines the
Commission’s rulemaking methods in light of Dodd-Frank.197 The
Commission will have to readjust its idea of what sort of federal
regulations must be in place in order for shareholders to be
adequately represented on company boards, to the extent that they
should be. Unfortunately, the court’s decision not to rule on whether
shareholders were already sufficiently protected under existing state
laws and proxy access rules leaves the Commission the opportunity
to pursue another rule like 14a-11. It is difficult to say whether the
Commission will do so. From the information provided by the court
and parties to this case, combined with information available from
other sources, it looks like it will be very difficult for the
Commission to formulate another rule that is similar in any

197

See Casey, infra note 198.
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meaningful way to Rule 14a-11 without getting the same response
from the courts.
A future rule with the same stated goal as 14a-11 is
nonetheless a reality. In her statement during the announcement of
the adopting release, Commissioner Kathleen Casey stated that the
Commission incorrectly believed it was putting this issue to bed by
issuing Rule 14a-11.198 She was clearly correct, as the rule is now
null. The issue is not at rest. Commissioner Elisse Walter
subsequently stated that the Commission was finally adopting “the
first effective mechanism to facilitate shareholder nomination and
voting rights.”199 Despite this case, there is little question that the
Commission believes that it needs to institute a rule to further
facilitate shareholders’ state law right to nominate and elect directors.
After the court’s ruling, Chairman Schapiro released a statement
declaring
I firmly believe that providing a meaningful
opportunity for shareholders to exercise their right to
nominate directors at their companies is in the best
interest of investors and our markets . . . I remain
committed to finding a way to make it easier for
shareholders to nominate candidates to corporate
boards.200
As the court stated, the Petitioners and the authors of their
supporting amicus curiae briefs made it quite clear that shareholders
can either exercise sufficient influence over companies, or divest
themselves of the company. Rather than seek to layer on additional
proxy access rules, the Commission will need to more diligently
improve its oversight capabilities provided under current laws. After
all, the Commission failed to establish why shareholders were not
being adequately protected. If shareholders are not satisfied with a
198

Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, Speech at SEC Hearing (Aug. 25,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htmI.d.
199
Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by
SEC Commissioner: Opening Statement at the SEC Open Meeting Speech at SEC
hearing
(Aug.
25,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510ebw.htm.
200
See Schapiro Press Release, supra note 6.
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current board of directors, they have the power (which they often
exercise) to nominate a new director if the bylaws provide for it.
They also have the power to vote with their feet, or choose not to
purchase the stock in the first place.
The Commission’s rules will continue to be deemed arbitrary
and capricious if it continues to insist that a minority of shareholders
can impose substantial proxy contest expenses upon the rest of the
shareholders, to say nothing about the consequences of a candidate’s
election. Of course, if a candidate is elected, it is apparently what the
shareholders en masse wish, and they will reap the rewards or
negative consequences accordingly. Indeed, efficient market theories
seem to indicate that this is already happening to the extent
shareholders want.
Public sentiment seems to indicate a growing desire for
more accountability of company managers. As discussed earlier,
shareholders are left with fewer methods of nominating directors, but
that does not mean that shareholders may not exercise the extensive
rights that they already have. Because of the direct and indirect costs
to companies, combined with the obvious potential (and probability)
for abuse by special interests, the vacation of Rule 14a-11 has likely
left shareholders better off than they would have been with it. More
does not necessarily equal better.
VI. CONCLUSION
Society must balance the rights and privileges it grants to
individuals. Congress enacted the APA to prevent the government
from usurping these rights, regardless of whether they are
purportedly enacted to protect people’s rights. By vacating Rule 14a11, the court has prevented an abuse of the Commission’s regulatory
power in the name of shareholders’ rights. Moreover, the opinion
gives guidance to the Commission as to its powers, responsibilities,
and expectations under Dodd-Frank. If the Commission chooses to
exercise its rulemaking authority to promote another rule designed to
facilitate shareholder nomination of director candidates, it will have
to do so within the constraints of this precedent.

